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COLLARING DRUG KINGPINS: INTERNATIONAL
EXTRADITION AND CONTINUING CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE
IN UNITED STATES v. LEVY
INTRODUCTION

In the fervent conduct of its declared war against illegal drugs and
all those who traffic in them, the United States Department of Justice
has increasingly relied upon measures such as the Continuing Criminal
Enterprise Act (CCE),1 commonly referred to as "kingpin" statutes.
These kingpin statutes are aimed at the leaders of criminal operations
that grow, manufacture, export and sell drugs, and have proven highly
successful in guaranteeing convictions of these individuals. However,
because many of the bosses of international criminal drug operations,
or cartels, reside outside the United States, the Department of Justice
must first apprehend them before they can be prosecuted and subsequently jailed in the United States. Thus, the United States must obtain the extradition of these drug lords to the United States from the
nations in which they reside.
To obtain international extradition in such cases, an extradition
treaty must exist between the United States and the nation in which
the drug lord resides.3 Bound not only by the language of these treaties,
but also by a set of international legal principles and procedural rules
which dictate how and when extradition can take place, the United
States has encountered difficulty extraditing individuals accused of
CCE violations.4
In determining the merit of an extradition request from the United
States, the nation in which the accused resides must decide whether
two of the fundamental principles of extradition exist- "double criminality" and "specialty." The doctrine of double criminality, also known
as dual criminality, requires that the "offense with which [the accused]
is charged . . . [be] punishable as a serious crime in both the request-

1. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1982 & Supp. V 1989).
2. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-68 (1982), is another "kingpin" statute.
3. Barbara Sicalides, RICO, CCE, and International Extradition, 62 TEMP. L.
REV. 1281, 1291-92 (1989) [hereinafter CCE and Extradition]. While almost all common law nations, including the United States, require the extradition of an accused
criminal to be based upon treaty, in some exceptional cases the transfer of an individual can be based upon comity or reciprocity. See Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S.
276 (1933); United States v. Accardi, 342 F.2d 697 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
954 (1965); United States v. Lehder-Rivas, 668 F. Supp. 1523 (M.D. Fla. 1987).
4. CCE and Extradition, supra note 3, at 1283.
(127)
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ing and requested state[s]." 5 The doctrine of specialty prohibits the requesting nation from prosecuting the accused for crimes other than
those upon which the extradition request was based."
Because the United States is unique in its statutory creation of
CCE, this statute's ability to satisfy the requirements of double criminality and specialty has been challenged.7 Those extradited under this
statute argue that double criminality is thwarted by the absence of
comparable CCE statutes in the nations from which they were extradited. They also allege that specialty is lacking when they are extradited for the "underlying predicate offenses [which make up CCE,
and] which are recognizable in the requested country, and later prosecute[d] . . . for substantive . . . CCE violations."'

United States v. Levy 9 reveals an increased judicial willingness to
sanction international extradition based upon the CCE statute. In sustaining the extradition in this case, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit broadly interpreted the principle of double criminality, focusing "not on how the crime is defined in the particular statutes the defendant is accused of violating,

. .

. [but] on the underlying

criminality of the defendant's alleged conduct."' 0
In addition, the Levy court refused to bar the defendant's conviction under CCE, despite "the fact that the order surrendering him to
American authorities neither mentioned CCE by name, nor recited all
of the elements of the crime."" The court expressed its belief "that
Hong Kong intended to extradite Levy not only on [the named
charges], but also on the CCE charge,"' 2 and asserted that the extradition request satisfied specialty by analogizing CCE to the requested nation's own criminal statutes. 3
This note will recount the historical basis of extradition in general
and the history of the CCE act, focusing particularly on double criminality and specialty. Furthermore, this note will argue that Levy serves
as the most recent guidepost in the federal bench's continuing journey
toward a broader interpretation of extradition requirements. While

5.
STATES

RESTATEMENT (THIRD)

6. M.
ORDER

OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS

§ 476(1)(c) (1987) (emphasis added) [hereinafter
CHERIF BASSIOUNI,

INTERNATIONAL

352-53 (1974) [hereinafter

LAW OF THE UNITED

RESTATEMENT].
EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC

BASSIOUNI].

7. CCE and Extradition, supra note 3, at 1284.
8. Id.
9. 905 F.2d 326 (10th Cir. 1990).
10. Id. at 328.
11. id.
12. Id. at 329.
13. Id. at 328-29.

1992]

UNITED STATES v. LEVY

some commentators may interpret extraditions based upon CCE violations as departures from the previous path of precedent in extradition
law, this note concludes that the Levy decision merely accelerates the
pace of the federal bench down the path of increasingly broader interpretations of extradition requirements, a path it has followed for most
of this century. Finally, this note cautions that, even if this brisk pace
is justified by the exigent circumstances inherent in fighting a wearisome drug war, the courts must take care not to overlook the basic
rights and liberties of nations and individuals upon which the procedural requirements of extradition are based.
I.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Lawrence Louis Levy, the reputed leader of one of the largest cocaine distribution rings in the history of Colorado, was indicted in 1985
on nineteen federal charges involving the sale of more than $12 million
worth of cocaine.1" Included among the nineteen charges were possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, conspiracy to commit the same
crime, and operating a continuing criminal exercise (CCE).1 5
Mr. Levy was apprehended and jailed in Hong Kong on June 6,
1986, for attempting to board an international flight from Hong Kong
to Tokyo, Japan, with a false passport. 16 Upon learning of this, the
United States immediately requested Mr. Levy's extradition based
upon his indictment for a number of drug related crimes, in addition to
CCE. 17 The acting governor of Hong Kong, noting that this extradition
request was the first seeking extradition for CCE under the United
States-United Kingdom Extradition Treaty, 8 translated the CCE
charge into five separate elements, each of which qualified as a crime in
Hong Kong, and referred the case to a magistrate. 9
The Hong Kong magistrate agreed with the acting governor's reformulation of the CCE charge into analogous crimes in Hong Kong,
and ordered Mr. Levy's extradition based upon the underlying criminal
conduct inherent in Mr. Levy's actions, rather than a direct correspon-

14. Karen Odom, Drug 'Kingpin' Statute Applied in Attempted Extradition,
L.J., Nov. 24, 1986, at 14 [hereinafter Odom].
15. Levy, 905 F.2d at 327.
16. Odom, supra note 14, at 14.
17. All extraditions from Hong Kong to the United States are covered by the
Treaty on Extradition, Jan. 21, 1977, U.S.-U.K., 28 U.S.T. 227 [hereinafter Treaty],
as Hong Kong is a member-state of the British Commonwealth.
18. CCE, as statutorily created in the United States, has no counterpart in the
United Kingdom or the British Commonwealth. See supra note 17.
19. Odom, supra note 14, at 14.
NAT'L
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dence between the CCE charge and specific statutory crimes in Hong
Kong. 20 The magistrate grounded his decision on the belief that limiting extradition to those crimes where the statutory language was identical in both the requesting and requested nations, "taken to its literal or
technical meaning, would limit and frustrate the obvious
purpose of the
21
two nations contracting in the treaty of extradition.
Upon his forced return to the United States, Mr. Levy was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado
on two counts of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and one
count of operating a CCE. 22 He appealed only the CCE conviction,
arguing "that his extradition and trial on the CCE charge violated the
' 23
doctrines of dual criminality and specialty.
II.

REASONING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

In deciding United States v. Levy, 24 the Tenth Circuit cited the
specific language of the extradition treaty between the United States
and the United Kingdom, as well as judicial precedent which interpreted the doctrines of double criminality and specialty. Circuit Judge
Stephen Anderson, writing for the court, found the focus of the double
criminality requirement of extradition to be "the criminality of the defendant's alleged conduct, ' 25 a broad and encompassing focus which
would disregard "how the crime is defined in the particular statutes the
defendant is accused of violating." 2 6
In asserting this interpretation of double criminality in the Levy
case, Judge Anderson cited the actual language of the extradition
treaty between the two nations, which states that "[e]xtradition shall
be granted for an act or omission[,] the facts of which disclose an offense."' 27 He then cited language from Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky,28 a

20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Levy, 905 F.2d at 327.
23. Id. at 328. Mr. Levy also attacked the validity of the CCE count of his original indictment on the grounds that the Government violated Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Street Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2510-21 (by presenting to the
grand jury witnesses discovered through electronic surveillance whose testimony was
relevant to the CCE count, without the requisite judicial approval), and that it failed to
sufficiently set out the continuing series of violations necessary for a CCE charge.
While neither argument has any bearing on the international extradition emphasis of
this note, it should be noted that both were rejected. Levy, 905 F.2d at 329-30.
24. 905 F.2d 326 (10th Cir. 1990).
25. Levy, 905 F.2d at 328.
26. Id.
27. Treaty, supra note 17, art. 111(1), 28 U.S.T. at 229 (emphasis added).
28. 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475" U.S. 1016 (1986).
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case involving the extradition from the United States to Israel of a man
accused of being the infamous Nazi concentration camp guard, "Ivan
the Terrible." The court in Demjanjuk asserted that "[i]f the acts upon
which the charges of the requesting country are based are also proscribed by a law of the requested nation, the requirement of double
criminality is satisfied." 2
To buttress the court's focus on the criminality of the acts themselves, rather than the statutory definition of the crimes within each
country, Judge Anderson quoted the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law which notes, "the fact that a particular act is classified differently in the criminal law of the two states . . . or that different requirements of proof are applicable in the two states does not defeat
extradition ...."30 Thus, Judge Anderson hinged the court's conclusion that the extradition "satisfie[d] the doctrine of dual criminality,""1
on its belief that the acts of which Mr. Levy was accused, namely leading a cocaine trafficking operation, were considered criminal in both
Hong Kong and the United States. 2
The court was equally unswayed by Mr. Levy's argument on appeal that, as he was never extradited on the CCE charge, the doctrine
of specialty, which provides that "once extradited, a person can be
prosecuted only for those charges on which he was extradited," 33 would
bar his trial on the CCE charge. The court summarily dismissed Mr.
Levy's reliance "upon the fact that the order surrendering him to
American authorities neither mentioned CCE by name nor recited all
of the elements of the crime."' 34 Judge Anderson maintained in his
opinion that "the Hong Kong courts clearly considered whether Levy
could be extradited on [CCE], and concluded both that it was an extraditable crime and that the evidence showed probable cause to believe
that the elements were present." 3' 5 This led the Tenth Circuit, after
considering the "totality of the circumstances," 36 to conclude that

29. Levy, 905 F.2d at 328 (quoting Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 579-80) (emphasis
added).
30. Id.(quoting the
THE UNITED STATES

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF

§ 476 cmt. d (1987)).

31. Id.
32. This was the same conclusion reached by Frank Gardner, the Magistrate in
Hong Kong who ordered the extradition.
33. United States v. Sensi, 879 F.2d 888, 892 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
34. Levy, 905 F.2d at 328.
35. Id.at 329.
36. The Court extracted this test from United States v. Flores, 538 F.2d 939, 945
(2d Cir. 1976), a case where specialty was satisfied in a prosecution following an extra-
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"Hong Kong intended to extradite Levy not only on the conspiracy and
possession with intent to distribute charges, but also on the CCE
charge.""

III.
A.

ANALYSIS

Statutory Definition of Continuing Criminal Enterprise

The Continuing Criminal Enterprise Act (CCE),3 8 commonly referred to as a "kingpin statute," was enacted in 1970 in an effort to
combat drug cartels by directly attacking their leadership. 39 Congress
believed that by severing the head of a narcotics operation, the body
would wither and die.4 0 If the director of an illegal narcotics organization is convicted under the CCE act, he could be sentenced to a prison
term of not less than twenty years to life, without the possibility of
parole. "1 In addition to the real threat of a lengthy incarceration,4"
CCE also authorizes the seizure of the kingpin's ill-gotten monetary
gains,"3 thus draining his criminal operation of working capital and resources and preventing one of the convicted drug lord's lieutenants
44
from assuming control of the organization.
In order to prosecute an individual accused of organizing a continuing criminal enterprise, the government must establish five predicate
elements. First, the defendant must have "violated one of the substan,45
tive drug crimes under Title XXI of the United States Code ....

dition from Spain to the U.S.. While the Flores court did not specifically refer to a
"totality of the circumstances" test, it implied that presumptions as to the extraditing
nation's purposes behind extradition could be used to satisfy specialty.
37. Levy, 905 F.2d at 329.
38. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1982 & Supp. V 1989).
39. See Garret v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 781 (1985); United States v. Sinito, 723 F.2d 1250, 1261-62 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817 (1984); United
States v. Webster, 639 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 935 (1982).
40. See H.R. Rep. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4576.
41. Steven Bernholz et al., International Extradition in Drug Cases, 10 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 353, 358 (1985) [hereinafter Bernholz]. See 21 U.S.C. §
848(a)(1)(c) (1982).
42. The average sentence for those convicted of CCE is 35 years. Bernholz, supra
note 41, at 358 n.30.
43. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1982 & Supp. V 1989). See CCE and Extradition,supra
note 3, at 1289 n.62.
44. CCE and Extradition, supra note 3, at 1305 n.175 and accompanying text.
45. Bernholz, supra note 41, at 358. These crimes include manufacturing, distributing, dispensing, possessing with the intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a
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Second, the defendant must be "engaged in a continuing series of fed-

eral drug felony violations."" Third, this series of violations must be
conducted in concert with five or more people.' 7 Fourth, the defendant
must have served as an organizer, supervisor or some other type of

leader within this operation." Lastly, the defendant must have derived
substantial income or resources from the criminal operation.' 9
While the CCE statute unquestionably provides prosecutors with
the means to effectively battle drug kingpins, its method of forging the
CCE violation from a series of underlying predicate offenses raises
questions concerning the doctrine of double criminality and specialty if
the United States attempts to extradite and try crime lords from other
nations. 50 Such questions cannot be answered without first exploring
the underlying principles and rationales of extradition.
B.

Principles of InternationalExtradition

In order to prosecute an individual for a criminal offense, a government must have jurisdiction over both the crime that was committed
and the individual accused of committing that crime. 5 A government
has jurisdiction over a crime if it is committed within the government's

controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a); conspiracy to commit the aforementioned
acts, Id. § 846; importing of controlled substances, Id. § 952; manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance with the intent to illegally import that substance, Id. §
959; conspiracy to commit the aforementioned acts with the intent to illegally import
that substance, Id. § 963.
46. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(1). See CCE and Extradition, supra note 3, at 1289. The
continuing series requirement has been defined as three or more federal narcotics violations. See United States v. Ordonez, 737 F.2d 793, 806 (9th Cir. 1984); United States
v. Brantley, 733 F.2d 1429, 1436 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1006 (1985);
United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1013 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S.
1136 (1982).
47. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (c)(2)(A). See CCE and Extradition, supra note 3, at 1289.
48. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (c)(2)(A). See CCE and Extradition,supra note 3, at 1289.
Courts have defined the terms organizer, manager, and supervisor according to common sense, practical and ordinary meaning considerations. See United States v. Wilkinson, 754 F.2d 1427, 1431 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1019 (1985).
49. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2)(B). See CCE and Extradition, supra note 3, at 1289.
The term "substantial income" has been defined as "what any reasonable person would
consider to be considerable or ample funds" from engaging in a continuing activity of
drug distribution while "income" is defined as "money or other material resources or
property received or gained directly from illegal narcotics transactions." U.S. v. Jeffers,
532 F.2d 1101, 1116 (7th Cir. 1976), modified, 432 U.S. 137, reh'g denied, 434 U.S.
880 (1977).
50. See CCE and Extradition, supra note 3, at 1290.
51. RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 475 cmt. d.
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territories or results in injurious repercussions within that government's
territories, even if the crime was committed outside of those territories. 5 2 A crime committed outside of a government's territories, however, usually means that the individual committing that crime is also
outside of the government's jurisdiction. In order to establish personal
jurisdiction over that individual, the government must request his or
her extradition.53
In 1902, the United States Supreme Court defined extradition as
the "surrender by one nation to another of an individual accused or
convicted of an offence outside of its own territory, and within the territorial jurisdiction of the other, which, being competent to try and punish him, demands the surrender. 5 4 In common law countries, the legal
basis for extradition is usually founded upon a bilateral extradition
treaty.55 In fact, the Supreme Court declared in Factor v. Laubenheimer 6 that:
While a government may, if agreeable to its own constitution
and laws, voluntarily exercise the power to surrender a fugitive
from justice to the country from which he has fled [based upon
a moral duty] ...the legal right to demand his extradition and
the correlative duty to surrender him . . . exists only when created by treaty.57
The United States is a party to over one hundred extradition treaties. 58 Each treaty establishes a legal basis for determining whether a
contracting party may extradite an individual to or from its country. 59
Whether an extradition is achieved through treaty or by a nation's voluntary surrender of an individual, however, the requirements of double
criminality and specialty apply.60

52. Id. at n. 1.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. § 475.
Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289 (1902).
See CCE and Extradition, supra note 4, at 1292.
290 U.S. 276 (1933).
Id. at 287.

IGOR KAVASS & ADOLF SPRUDZS, A GUIDE TO UNITED STATES TREATIES IN
FORCE 404-05 (1986). This guide lists the United States' extradition treaties, which

are greater in number than any other country.
59. While there have been recent efforts to create multilateral conventions dictating international extradition to aid in the prosecution of international drug crimes, "bilateral treaties remain the prevailing international practice." CCE and Extradition,
supra note 3, at 1292; see also BASSIOUNI, supra note 6, at 322.
60. CCE and Extradition, supra note 3, at 1294.
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When another nation makes an extradition request to the United
States, a federal judge or magistrate determines whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the accused's extradition.6 1 The role of a magistrate "is not to decide guilt or innocence but to determine whether
there is competent legal evidence to justify holding the accused for
trial." 62 Because a magistrate's "certification of extraditability is not a
'final order,' "63 there can be no direct appeal to a federal court. Thus,
a federal court's review of a magistrate's decision occurs only upon a
petition for writ of habeas corpus.6"
The scope of a federal court's inquiry into these cases, therefore, is
"limited to determining 'whether the magistrate had jurisdiction,
whether the offense charged is within the treaty and by a somewhat
liberal construction, whether there was any evidence warranting the
finding that there was reasonable ground to believe the accused
guilty.' "" It is important to note that the courts' determination of
whether the offense charged is within the treaty involves judicial review
of the principle of double criminality. This review to determine whether
double criminality has been satisfied "is a 'purely legal question' to be
66
reviewed de novo."
Likewise, when a defendant is extradited to the United States, as
is the case in Levy, an appeal is available only after a trial on the
charges upon which extradition was based. On appeal, however, the
court may examine the sufficiency of the accused's extradition through
de novo review of both the principles of dual criminality and specialty.
American courts have traditionally refused to recognize another
nation's extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction over an accused residing
in the United States unless the extradition request is reasonable. In
Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines,67 the U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Columbia Circuit evaluated the reasonableness of an extradition request for crimes which had injurious repercussions in the requesting nation by first measuring the severity of

61. Bernholz, supra note 41, at 355.
62. In re Extradition of Russell, 789 F.2d 801, 802 (9th Cir. 1986).
63. Id. at 803.
64. See Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925). However, habeas corpus
is a remedy open to the accused. In the event of an unfavorable ruling by a magistrate,
the government may refile the extradition request with a different judge. In re Mackin,
668 F.2d 122, 128 (2d Cir. 1981).
65. Brauch v. Raiche, 618 F.2d 843, 847 (1st Cir. 1980) (quoting Fernandez,268
U.S. at 312).
66. Peters v. Egnor, 888 F.2d 713, 718 (10th Cir. 1989) (quoting Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 791 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986)).
67. 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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those repercussions within that nation. The court stated that "[a]s long
as the territorial effects are not so inconsequential as to exceed the
bounds of reasonableness imposed by international law, prescriptive juand concluded that
exercised,"'68
is legitimately
risdiction
"[jjurisdiction exists only when significant effects were intended within
the prescribing territory." 6 9 Only when the territorial effects are minimal and when there is no intent by the accused to cause detrimental
harm to the requesting nation, are American courts likely to refuse
extradition.7"
1. Doctrine of Double Criminality
Double criminality is often referred to as the "keystone of international extradition law."' 71 As defined by the court in Levy, the "doctrine
of dual criminality provides that a person shall not be extradited 'if the
offense with which he is charged . . .is not punishable as a serious
crime in both the requesting and requested state[s].' "72 Traditionally,
double criminality is "expressly embodied in all United States extradition treaties in one of two forms." 7 3 The first form limits the offenses
for which extradition may be granted to those specifically listed in the
treaty. This is known as the "enumerative method." 7 The second,
known as the "eliminative method," limits extraditable offenses to
those punishable by a sentence of agreed upon severity.7 5 The extradition treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom, which
was binding in the Levy case, 6 is both enumerative and eliminative. It
not only lists twenty-nine extraditable offense in a schedule annexed to
the treaty 7 7 but also includes a provision whereby extradition between

68. Id. at 923.
69. Id.
70. Republic of Fr. v. Moghadam, 617 F. Supp. 777, 787 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
71. Bernholz, supra note 41, at 355.
72. United States v. Levy, 905 F.2d 326, 328 (10th Cir. 1990)(quoting Peters v.
Egnor, 888 F.2d 713, 718 (10th Cir. 1989) (quoting RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, §
476(1)(c)).
73. Bernholz, supra note 41, at 355.
74. David Levy, Double Criminality and the U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty: Hu
Yau-Leung v. Soscia, 8 BROOK. J. INT'L. L. 475 (1982) [hereinafter Double
Criminality].
75. Id.
76. Hong Kong, as a member of the British Commonwealth, is bound by all treaties to which the United Kingdom is a party.
77. Treaty, supra note 17, 28 U.S.T. at 235. The crimes enumerated in this
schedule run the gamut from murder, to bigamy, to piracy, to the unlawful seizure of
an aircraft (hijacking). The twelfth offense listed on the schedule names "[a]n offense
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the two nations can be achieved for those criminal acts which are "punishable under the laws of both Parties by imprisonment or other form
of detention for more than one year or by the death penalty," 8 even
though the acts are not enumerated in the treaty. The "laws" alluded
to by this provision of the treaty have been interpreted to include both
federal and/or state law. 79

Courts in different nations and different eras have not always concurred in their interpretations of the double criminality requirement intrinsic in each extradition treaty. When a court strictly interprets a
treaty's double criminality requirements, it prohibits extradition in any
case where the label attached to an offense, or its legal elements, are
not identical in both the requesting and requested nations.8" Strict interpretations of this nature are rare,8 1 however, as most nations choose
to apply a liberal interpretive method.82
Courts choosing a liberal interpretation of double criminality requirements 83 "focus on the criminal nature of the alleged conduct, regardless of its specific label or whether its elements correlate in both
the requesting and requested nations."8' 4 The Supreme Court in Collins
v. Loisel 3 interpreted the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842, an ear-

against the law relating to narcotic drugs, . . .cocaine and its derivatives, and other
dangerous drugs" as an extraditable offense. Id. It should be noted that although this
treaty was formulated after the enactment of the CCE statute, CCE is not specifically
named as an extraditable offense.
78. Id. at 229, art. 1II(1)(a).
79. See Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 58-59 (1903); Hu Yau-Leung v. Soscia,
649 F.2d 914, 918 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 972 (1981); Brauch v. Raiche, 618
F.2d 843, 851 (1st Cir. 1980).
80. CCE and Extradition,supra note 3, at 1297.
81. Requiring identical names and elements of criminal offenses in order to justify
extradition has resulted in absurd outcomes which often defeat the intent of the parties
to the extradition treaty. Normally, a strict interpretation is given to the double criminality requirements of extradition treaties only if "a foreign relations conflict between
[two] states over a separate issue [exists], and [the requested state decides to] prohibit
extradition to a hostile requesting nation." Id.
82. A severe and rigid application of double criminality "would frustrate the main
objective of extradition, the administration of justice. Countries employing the liberal
interpretative method do so because, in their view, the benefits of international cooperation in the suppression of crime outweigh the importance of the sovereignty doctrine [in
which the strict interpretation theory is couched]." Id. at 1298.
83. The liberal method of interpreting double criminality requirements originated
in Great Britain, in a case where a British court analogized the French crime of "falsification of accounts" to the British crime of "forgery." See In re Arton (No. 2), 1 Q.B.
509 (1896).
84. CCE and Extradition, supra note 3, at 1297-98.
85. 259 U.S. 309 (1922).
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lier United States-United Kingdom extradition treaty, by stating:
The law does not require that the name by which the crime is
described in the two countries shall be the same; nor that the
scope of liability shall be coextensive, or, in other respects, the
same in the two countries. It is enough if the particular act
charged is criminal in both jurisdictions.""
This focus on the acts of the accused, rather than the statutory
definition of the criminal activity prevents
[t]he fact that defenses may be available in the requested state
that would not be available in the requesting state, or that different requirements of proof are applicable in the two states
. . . [from] defeat[ing] extradition under the double criminality principle. 7
Throughout most of this century, American courts have been unreceptive to "overly defined arguments that seek to distinguish domestic crimes from [their] foreign counterparts." 8 Most recently, a federal
circuit court reaffirmed this principle in its interpretation of the current
United States-United Kingdom extradition treaty.89 In United States v.
Sensi,90 cited by the court in Levy, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit asserted that " '[a]lthough the charges of the
indictment may not correspond exactly to English offenses, it is the
facts or underlying conduct supporting the charges which must
correlate.' "911
While U.S. courts ruling on double criminality have not required
statutes to be identical, they have required the crimes, as defined in the
requesting and requested nation, to be "substantially analogous." 92
Statutes are substantially analogous "when they 'punish conduct falling
within the broad scope' of the same 'generally recognized crime.' "93 It

86. Id. at 312.
87. Restatement, supra note 5, at § 476, cmt. d.
88. CCE and Extradition, supra note 3, at 1298 n.130. See also BASSIOUNI, supra
note 6, at 322.
89. Treaty, supra note 17.
90. 879 F.2d 888 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
91. Id. at 894 (quoting the lower court in the same case, United States v. Sensi,
664 F. Supp. 566, 570 (D.D.C. 1987)) (emphasis in original).
92. Brauch v. Raiche, 618 F.2d 843, 851 (1st Cir. 1980).
93. Peters v. Egnor, 888 F.2d 713, 719 (10th Cir. 1989)(quoting Brauch, 618
F.2d at 848 n.7, 852).
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is important to note, however, that this line of American precedent,

which has focused on the criminal act rather than its statutory definition when determining double criminality, largely deals with a single
charge for each criminal transaction.
In Levy, the United States requested extradition on the predicate
drug offenses which make up CCE, as well as CCE itself. Hong Kong,
however, only had crimes that were analogous to the predicate drug

offenses upon which the CCE charge was based. Thus, the United
States sought to tie two distinct charges into one criminal transaction.
2.

Doctrine of Specialty

Directly related to the principle of double criminality is the doctrine of specialty. 4 The Levy court characterized specialty as the precept "which provides that 'once extradited, a person can be prosecuted
only for those charges on which he was extradited.' "' Implicit in this
doctrine is the idea that a nation surrenders its sovereignty only as to
the offenses upon which it extradites, and no others.9" The doctrine of
specialty guarantees the rights of the asylum state, not the rights of the
defendant. 97 Thus, an asylum nation may waive its right to limit any
post-extradition prosecutions, 8 or it may "consent to extradite the defendant for [specific] offenses other than those expressly enumerated in
the treaty,"9' 9 and the defendant will be unable to claim the protection
of the doctrine of specialty. Because every extradition is based-upon a
"reliance on the representations made by the requesting country," 10

94. There are five rationales underlying the doctrine of specialty: (1) the requested nation would have refused extradition if it had anticipated a prosecution for an
offense not included in the extradition request; (2) the requesting nation lacks in personam jurisdiction over the defendant, thus necessitating the extradition request; (3)
prosecution and punishment are made possible by the requested nation's surrender of
the defendant; (4) use of the requested nation's processes to effectuate extradition for
an offense not included in the extradition request would constitute an abuse of that
nation's process; and (5) the requested nation undertakes the extradition based upon its
reliance on the terms of the requesting nation's extradition request. See Bernholz,
supra note 41, at 364-65; CCE and Extradition, supra note 3, at 1299.
95. Levy, 905 F.2d at 328 (quoting Peters, 888 F.2d at 720 n.9).
96. See Berenguer v. Vance, 473 F. Supp. 1195 (D.D.C. 1979).
97. United States ex rel. Donnelly v. Mulligan, 76 F.2d 511, 513 (2d Cir. 1935)
(extradition treaties are for benefit of the contracting nations; thus, rights of asylum
and immunity belong to the contracting nations and not the accused).
98. See Berenguer, 473 F. Supp. at 1197.
99. United States v. Thirion, 813 F.2d 146, 151 (8th Cir. 1987) (quoting United
States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir. 1986)).
100. Bernholz, supra note 41, at 365.
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deviations from the doctrine of specialty are likely to chill further extraditions between the two nations. 10 1
The Supreme Court first recognized that U.S. extraditions were
02
bound by the doctrine of specialty in United States v. Rauscher.1
Since then, U.S. courts have been willing to interpret specialty as liberally as they have double criminality, and have often limited post-extradition prosecutions under specialty only when the asylum nation's extradition order specifically prohibited, by name, the offense for which
the defendant was tried.' 013 A number of courts have employed a less
absolute, and more subjective analysis "[i]n determining whether the
principle [of specialty] has been abrogated in a given instance."'10 This
approach inquires "whether the surrendering state would regard the
prosecution [for offenses not listed in the indictment] . . . as a
06
a federal
breach."' 1 5 Using this method in United States v. Diwan,1
appellate court found that a prosecution for charges not listed in an
extradition request from the United States to the United Kingdom
would not have been regarded by Great Britain as an "affront to its
sovereignty."' 1 The court based this determination on the English authorities' subsequent endorsement of the prosecution. 0 8 Likewise, the
court in Levy found that the Hong Kong magistrate's actions prior to
Levy's extradition, and the absence of governmental protest following
Levy's conviction on CCE, were sufficient to imply a waiver by Hong
Kong of its rights under the rules of specialty. 0 9
C.

CCE as an Extraditable Offense

CCE has proven to be a highly successful weapon in the ongoing
drug war. By utilizing a variety of narcotics offenses as the predicates
of the greater CCE offense, wise prosecutorial use of CCE has enabled
the United States Justice Department to strike at the heart of the large

101. S.Z. Feller, Reflections on the Nature of the Specialty Principle in Extradition Relations, 12 IsR. L. REV. 466 (1977).
102. 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
103. See generally United States v. Flores, 538 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1976).
104. United States v. Jetter, 722 F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1983).
105. Fiocconi v. Attorney General of the United States, 462 F.2d 475, 480 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972). See also United States v. Paroutian, 299
F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1962).
106. 864 F.2d 715 (11th Cir. 1989).
107. Id. at 721.
108. Id.
109. Levy, 905 F.2d at 329.
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international drug cartels."' While the uniqueness of the CCE statute
has been a boon to prosecutors once a drug kingpin is in custody, this
singularity has also proved to be a source of great confusion when the
same prosecutors seek to extradite those kingpins."' The fact that no
other nation has enacted a parallel statute, combined with the absence
of CCE's mention in most extradition treaties, leads courts to question
CCE's ability to satisfy the requirements of double criminality and
specialty.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit answered that question in Levy by liberally interpreting the focus of
double criminality, as well as the intentions of the extraditing nation.
By expanding the focus of dual criminality beyond the statutory definition of a crime to encompass the "criminality of the defendant's alleged
conduct","' the Levy court seized upon a pronounced willingness of
American courts to concentrate on "[t]he essential character of a
[criminal] transaction." ' " Additionally, the Levy court exhibited a
willingness to allow the number of offenses tied to the criminal transaction for which the defendant was extradited, to be enlarged after
extradition.
In determining that double criminality had been satisfied, the Levy
court concentrated on the acts which the defendant was accused of
committing, namely "being the leader of a cocaine trafficking operation."" 4 These acts, the court concluded, consisted of conduct "illegal
in both Hong Kong and the United States.""' 5 The fact that such acts
were defined and punished as severe crimes in a certain way in the
United States, and in another, but equally severe way in Hong Kong,
was enough to satisfy the requirements of double criminality." 6 Thus,
the Court in Levy followed the principle that "[d]ouble criminality
does not require that an offense have the same name in the two states
at issue ... or ... the same terms or that every element of the crime in
both the requesting and requested states correspond identically.""'
It significantly expanded this concept by applying it to CCE, a

110. United States v Sinito, 723 F.2d 1250, 1261-62 (6th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Webster, 639 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1981).
111. CCE and Extradition, supra note 3, at 1309.
112. Levy, 905 F.2d at 328.
113. Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 58-59 (1903).
114. Levy, 905 F.2d at 328.
115. Id.
116. See United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1185 (2d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied 110 S. Ct. 1138 (1990); United States v. Leder-Rivas, 668 F. Supp. 1523
(1987). See also Artukovic v. Rison, 784 F.2d 1354, 1356 (9th Cir. 1986).
117. CCE and Extradition, supra note 3, at 1312.
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crime which has no true counterpart in other jurisdictions and which is
built from predicate offenses. The court was satisfied that the criminal
acts which constituted the predicate offenses to CCE were illegal in
Hong Kong, and would allow for extradition to the United States by
satisfying double criminality. However, this expansion ignored the extradition requirement espoused by the Ninth Circuit in Cucuzzella v.
Keliikoa." 8 The Cucuzzella court prohibited extradition without a decision on "the extraditabi-lity of each offense[,] and not just each
transaction."' "19
Cucuzzella's added attention to the charges themselves and the
number of charges tied to each criminal transaction, was also asserted
in Shapiro v. Ferrandina."° In Shapiro, the court distinguished between specialty as applied to situations involving "a mere lack of parallelism in nomenclature, . . . [or] with crimes so factually intertwined as
to constitute a logical whole, . . . [and] multiple characterizations of
the acts charged [so as to] raise potential problems of greatly increased
punishment through successive sentences."' 21 Extraditions in CCE
prosecutions, by the very nature of their dependence on predicate offenses and the prospect of severe punishment upon conviction, demand
the greater scrutiny called for in Shapiro and Cucuzzella.
The Levy court ignored the distinctions highlighted in Shapiro,
and instead concentrated on the intentions of the extraditing nation
through a consideration of the "totality of the circumstances."' 2 Levy
contended that the doctrine of specialty barred his prosecution on CCE
as "the order surrendering him to American authorities neither mentioned CCE by name nor recited all of the elements of the crime. "2'
Nevertheless, the Levy court looked at the Hong Kong magistrate's decision to extradite the defendant, and presumed, without explicit support, that the magistrate "clearly considered whether Levy could be
extradited on [CCE], and concluded both that it was an extraditable
crime and that the evidence showed probable cause to believe that the
elements were present." 2 4
The Levy court, convinced by the Hong Kong magistrate's attempts to analogize CCE to statutory offenses within its own jurisdic-

118. 638 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1980).
119. Matter of Extradition of Prushinowski, 574 F. Supp. 1439 (E.D.N.C. 1983)
(citing Cucuzzella, 638 F.2d at 107).
120. 478 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1973).
121. Id. at 908-09.
122. Levy, 905 F.2d at 329.
123. Id. at 328.
124. Id. at 329.
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tion, based its reliance on the significance of such analogies on United
States v. Herbage.125 In Herbage, the court found that specialty was
not violated when the defendant was prosecuted for a U.S. statutory
violation known as misuse of the mails, which a British magistrate had
analogized to fraud in the extradition order. 2 6 The Levy court was also
willing to overlook the absence of any mention of CCE in the extradition order, because the "totality of the circumstances" indicated that
the extraditing magistrate had considered CCE in his decision to
extradite."17
The Levy court's reliance on the Hong Kong magistrate's vague
consideration of CCE would not meet the standard established by the
Ninth Circuit in Caplan v. Vokes.' 2 8 The court in Caplan stated that:
lAin adequate extradition proceeding must include in its record
a specific delineation, as to each charge, of the legal theories
under the requesting country's law by which the accused's conduct is alleged to constitute an extraditable offense, together
with an identification of the corresponding offenses in this country relied on to show that the "dual criminality" requirement
has been met.'2 9
Because exacting findings of this nature were missing in that case,
the court in Caplan voided the defendant's extradition. The absence of
similar findings in Levy, however, did not convince the court-to grant
the defendant relief.
The Levy court based it refusal to separate CCE from its predicate
parts on similar actions by a number of other courts. In United States
v. Lehder-Rivas, 3° a federal district court in Florida determined that
an extradition on CCE did not violate the doctrine of double criminality. The court in Lehder-Rivas rejected the contention that " 'the determination of whether [CCE] is recognized as punishable in the re-

125. 850 F.2d 1463 (11th Cir. 1988), cerl. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1158 (1989).

126. Id. at 1466.
127. The decision cited United States v. Jetter, 722 F.2d 371, 373 (8th Cir.
1983)(a case which, upon consideration of all the circumstances, allowed a prosecution
for conspiracy even though conspiracy was omitted from the extradition order), and
United States v. Lehder-Rivas, 668 F. Supp. 1523 (M.D. Fla. 1987)(a case where specialty was found in the converse situation when the extraditing nation did not consider
the CCE charge in its extradition proceedings, but did include it in the extradition
order).
128. 649 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1981).

129. Id. at 1344.
130. 668 F. Supp. 1523 (M.D. Fla. 1987).
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quested country must be made with reference to CCE as a whole and
not its separate parts.' "131 The Lehder-Rivas court interpreted double
criminality to require a "substantially analogous" standard, rejecting a
"strict congruity of offenses" standard.
Furthermore, like the court in Flores,1 33 the Lehder-Rivas court
looked at the "totality of the circumstances," including the negotiations
which preceded the treaty and the asylum nation's actions in responding to the extradition request, and applied them to a liberal construction generally given to extradition treaties. 133
Thus, the Levy court was satisfied that the requirements of double
criminality and specialty had been met, as exhibited by the implications of Hong Kong's actions prior to and subsequent to Levy's extradition. The court was unpersuaded by Levy's technical distinctions between Hong Kong's analogies of the CCE charge and its definition in
the United States.
CONCLUSION

Nations have increasingly demonstrated a willingness to
subordinate the principles of double criminality and specialty to the
necessities of fighting the international drug war. These countries recognize that if these statutes are "defined in over-technical terms [they]
would preclude extradition by reason of technical differences between
legal systems notwithstanding that the acts alleged against the accused
involve serious criminality under the law of both requesting and requested states."''
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the willingness of the Levy
court to broadly focus on the criminality of the defendant's acts rather
than the criminal accusations tied to those acts in relation to the double
criminality requirement. Perhaps more disturbing is the court's equally
cavalier divination of the extraditing nation's purposes for extraditing.
Even without a reference to a specific crime in the extradition order,
the court in Levy was willing to scour the record of the extradition
proceedings to find the suggestion it needed to meet the requirement of

131. Id. at 1527 (quoting Bernholz, supra note 41, at 361).
132. United States v. Flores, 538 F.2d 939, 945 (2d Cir. 1976).
133. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293-94 (1933) (if a treaty fairly admits of two constructions, one restricting rights which may be claimed under it, and the
other enlarging it, the more liberal construction is to be preferred). See also United
States v. Wiebe, 733 F.2d 549, 554 (8th Cir. 1984) (extradition treaties are to be
construed liberally to effect their purpose, i.e., the surrender of fugitives to be tried for
their alleged offenses).
134. Riley v. Commonwealth, 60 A.L.G.R. 106, 111 (Austl. 1985).
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specialty. While the court's actions in Levy may not have been egregious due to the unsympathetic nature of the defendant and the facts of
the case, the precedent established may allow future courts to construct
an answer to questions of specialty based upon nothing more than their
own desire to affirmatively answer such questions.
Levy's defense might have been more effective had it directed the
court's attention to the dangerous potential for cumulative and repetitive charges which could have been brought under this precedent
against U.S. citizens extradited to foreign lands for individual offenses.
The Levy court's willingness to rely generally on the purpose behind
extradition treaties, and specifically on the absence of objection by
Hong Kong to Levy's prosecution under CCE, however, indicates that
the Tenth Circuit was unwilling to prevent the extradition of defendants based upon strict interpretations of the underlying doctrines of international extradition. The court in Levy seemed satisfied to rely on
the notion of comity, or reciprocal courtesy between nations, upon
which extradition is fundamentally based, to prevent the misuse of extraditions by contracting nations.
Roger McDonough

